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The study of the response of complex dynamical social, biological, or technological networks to
external perturbations has numerous applications. Random Boolean Networks (RBNs) are com-
monly used a simple generic model for certain dynamics of complex systems. Traditionally, RBNs
are interconnected randomly and without considering any spatial extension and arrangement of the
links and nodes. However, most real-world networks are spatially extended and arranged with reg-
ular, power-law, small-world, or other non-random connections. Here we explore the RBN network
topology between extreme local connections, random small-world, and pure random networks, and
study the damage spreading with small perturbations. We find that spatially local connections
change the scaling of the relevant component at very low connectivities (K¯ ≪ 1) and that the crit-
ical connectivity of stability Ks changes compared to random networks. At higher K¯, this scaling
remains unchanged. We also show that the relevant component of spatially local networks scales
with a power-law as the system size N increases, but with a different exponent for local and small-
world networks. The scaling behaviors are obtained by finite-size scaling. We further investigate
the wiring cost of the networks. From an engineering perspective, our new findings provide the
key design trade-offs between damage spreading (robustness), the network’s wiring cost, and the
network’s communication characteristics.
PACS numbers: 05.45.-a, 05.65.+b, 89.75.-k
I. INTRODUCTION
The robustness against failures, the wiring cost, and
the communication characteristics are key measures of
most complex, finite-size real-world networks. For exam-
ple, the electrical power grid needs to be robust against
a variety of failures, minimize the wiring cost, and min-
imize the transmission losses. Similarly, the neural cir-
cuitry in the human brain requires efficient signal trans-
mission and robustness against damage while being con-
strained in volume.
In this letter, we use random Boolean networks (RBNs)
as a simple model to study the (1) robustness, i.e., the
damage spreading, (2) the wiring cost, and (3) the com-
munication characteristics as a function of different net-
work topologies (local, small-world, random), different
connectivities K¯, and different network sizes N . More
generally speaking, this allows us to answer the question
of how much and what type of interconnectivity a complex
network—in our case RBNs—needs in order to satisfy
given restrictions on the robustness against certain types
of failure, the (wiring) cost, and the (communication) ef-
ficiency. The work presented here extends previous work
by Rohlf et al. [17] to new network topologies, which are
more biologically plausible, such as for example small-
world topologies.
∗Electronic address: luq2@rpi.edu
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RBNs were originally introduced by Kauffman as sim-
plified models of gene regulation networks [6, 7]. In its
simplest form, an RBN is discrete dynamical system, also
called NK network (or model), composed of N automata
(or nodes), each of which receives inputs from K (either
exact or average) randomly chosen other automata. Each
automaton is a Boolean variable with two possible states:
{0, 1}, and the dynamics is such that
F : {0, 1}N 7→ {0, 1}N , (1)
where F = (f1, ..., fi, ..., fN), and each fi is represented
by a look-up table of Ki inputs randomly chosen from
the set of N automata. Initially, Ki neighbors and a
look-table are assigned to each automaton at random.
fi : {0, 1}
Ki 7→ {0, 1}. (2)
An automaton state σti ∈ {0, 1} is updated using its cor-
responding Boolean function:
σt+1i = fi(x
t
i1 , x
t
i2 , ..., x
t
iKi
). (3)
We randomly initialize the states of the automata (initial
condition of the RBN). The automata are updated syn-
chronously using their corresponding Boolean functions.
σt+1 = F(σt), (4)
In the thermodynamic limit, RBNs exhibit a dynami-
cal order-disorder transition at a sparse critical connec-
tivity Kc [4]. For a finite system size N , the dynamics of
RBNs converge to periodic attractors after a finite num-
ber of updates. AtKc, the phase space structure in terms
of attractor periods [1], the number of different attractors
[20] and the distribution of basins of attraction [2] is com-
plex, showing many properties reminiscent of biological
networks [7].
The study of the response of complex dynamical net-
works to external perturbations, also referred to as dam-
age, has numerous applications, e.g., the spreading of
disease through a population [11, 14], the spreading of a
computer virus on the internet [3], failure propagation in
power grids [18], the perturbation of gene expression pat-
terns in a cell due to mutations [16], or the intermittent
stationary state in economic decision networks triggered
by the mutation of strategy from a few individual agents
[13]. Mean-field approaches, e.g., the annealed approxi-
mation (AA) introduced by Derrida and Pomeau [4], al-
low for an analytical treatment of damage spreading and
exact determination of the critical connectivity Kc under
various constraints [9, 21]. However, these approxima-
tions rely on the assumption that N →∞, which, for an
application to real-world problems, is often an irrelevant
limit. A number of studies [8, 10] has recently focused
on the finite-size scaling of (un-)frozen and/or relevant
nodes in RBN with respect to N with the goal to go be-
yond the annealed approximation. Only a few studies,
however, consider finite-size scaling of damage spreading
in RBNs [16, 17, 19]. Of particular interest is the “sparse
percolation (SP) limit” [19], where the initial perturba-
tion size d(0) does not scale up with the network size
N , i.e., the relative size of perturbations tends to zero
for large N . In [17] Rohlf et al. have identified a new
characteristic connectivity Ks for RBNs, at which the av-
erage number of damaged nodes d¯, after a large number
of dynamical updates, is independent of N . This limit is
particularly relevant to information and damage propa-
gation in many technological and natural networks. The
work in this letter extends these new findings and system-
atically studies damage spreading in RBNs as a function
of new network topologies, namely local and small-world,
different connectivities K¯, and different network sizes N .
II. DAMAGE SPREADING
For our purpose, we measure the expected damage d¯
as the Hamming distance between two different initial
system configurations after a large number of T system
updates. The randomly chosen initial conditions differ
by one bit, i.e., the damage size is 1. As introduced in
[17], let N be a randomly sampled set (ensemble) of zN
networks with average degree K¯, In a set of zI random
initial conditions tested on network n, and I ′n a set of
zI random initial conditions differing in one randomly
chosen bit from these initial conditions. Then we have
d¯ =
1
zN zI
zN∑
n=1
Nn∈N
zI∑
i=1
~σi∈In,~σ′i∈I
′
n
dni (T ), (5)
where dni (T ) is the measured Hamming distance after
T system updates. Rohlf et al. [17] have shown that
there exists a characteristic connectivity Ks, at which
the average number of damaged nodes d¯, after a large
number of dynamical updates, is independent of N .
In a given network, the nodes can be classified accord-
ing to their response to the network dynamics (e.g., see
[8, 10]). This classification allows to better explain the
global network behavior with respect to external pertur-
bations.
A set of nodes is said to be part of the frozen component
(or frozen core) if each node’s output is constant regard-
less of its inputs. The states of these nodes remain con-
stant on every attractor, so that external perturbations
cannot spread into the frozen component. The frozen
core does thus not contribute to the damage spreading.
The irrelevant nodes (or irrelevant component) are the
nodes whose outputs may change, but their outputs are
only connected to either frozen or other irrelevant nodes.
Again, these nodes do not participate in the damage
spreading. The remaining set of nodes are the relevant
nodes (or relevant component). Their state changes and
each relevant node is connected to at least another rel-
evant node. As their name suggests, the relevant nodes
are the crucial ones, which determine the number and the
period of attractors in a given network. For our purpose,
studying the scaling behavior of the relevant component
is important for the study of damage spreading because
the Hamming distance between the damaged and the un-
damaged network can be viewed as a quantitative mea-
sure of the distance between the two different attractors
the networks settle in.
In this letter, we use three exemplary types of network
topologies: (1) random, (2) spatially local, and (3) small-
world. In the following we will describe the models we
used to create each of these network topologies and what
the relevant parameters are. For more details see the
text in the next three sections (II A, II B, and II C). Note
that in all of these network topologies, the links are di-
rected, self-loops are allowed, and multiple-links between
the same pair of nodes are excluded.
a. Random topology. Each of the N nodes has a uni-
form probability to be connected to any other node in
the network. The average connectivity is K¯. This topol-
ogy corresponds to the original NK model proposed by
Kauffman [6].
b. Spatially local topology. N nodes are uniformly
and randomly distributed in a unit d-dimensional spa-
tial area (non-periodical). Each node randomly connects
to its nearest neighbors (including itself) until the desig-
nated K¯ is reached. This network topology can be classi-
fied as a spatial graph. In the limit of small K¯ (K¯ ≪ N),
such a d-dimensional, spatially local network has an av-
erage path length of ∼ N1/d [23], which is similar to a
d-dimensional regular lattice [12].
c. Small-world topology. Starting from 2D spatially
local networks as described above, we apply a rewiring
method to obtain a small-world network topology. The
2
source of every existing link will be rewired with proba-
bility p to a randomly chosen node in the network. Thus,
when p → 0, we obtain the original spatially local net-
work, while for p → 1 we obtain a random graph as
described above.
A. RBNs with a Random Network Topology
Rohlf et. al. [17] have systematically investigated
damage spreading, i.e., the evolution of the Hamming
distance d¯R, of random Boolean networks at the sparse
percolation (SP) limit. By using finite-size scaling, they
found a new characteristic connectivity KS = 1.875 at
which the damage spreading is independent of the sys-
tem size N .
In the limit of a small average degree K¯ → 0, the
initial perturbation persists only when the damage hits
nodes that are in loops of length two or that have self-
connections. For a random network topology, the proba-
bility of generating such loops scales with Ploop ∼ 1/N2,
where N is the system size. Thus, the Hamming dis-
tance is proportional to the number of simple loops,
d¯R ∼ PloopK¯N ∼ N−1. For large K¯, the relevant compo-
nent grows comparable with the system size, so the initial
damage now percolates through the entire network, and
we have d¯R ∼ N . For arbitrary K¯, the Hamming dis-
tance d¯R scales as follows [17]:
d¯R(K¯,N) ∼ a(K¯)N
γR(K¯) , (6)
where γR → −1 at K¯ → 0 and γR → 1 at large K¯.
At criticality (i.e., K = 2), the asymptotic dynamics are
determined entirely by the relevant component, which
scales as nr ∼ N1/3 [8], thus γR(Kc) ≃ 1/3. As already
seen above, at K¯ = Ks = 1.875 we have γR(Ks) = 0, and
the Hamming distance d¯ is independent of the system size
N [17]. This means that at the “critical connectivity of
stability” Ks, the damage caused by initial perturbations
is confined at a finite level (i.e., the proportion of damage
goes to zero as N →∞), regardless of the system size N .
Figure 1 shows the power-law dependence of the Ham-
ming distance d¯ as a function of the system size N for
multiple K¯ and for our three types of random network
classes. γR as a function of the average degree K¯ is shown
in Fig. 2.
B. RBNs with Spatially Local Connections
Many real-world networks are spatially extended and
have a more structured interconnect topology than pure
random networks have. Such networks are commonly
called complex networks. Spatial networks with local con-
nections only, such as regular grids, have a large average
path length (l ∼ N1/d) and are highly clustered. In this
section, we look at the dynamics of spatial RBNs with lo-
cal connections only. The underlying network structure
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FIG. 1: The Hamming distance d¯ as a function of the system
size N for (a) random networks, (b) networks with spatially
local connections, and (c) small-world networks, for different
K¯. K¯ takes the values 2.6, 2.2, 2.0, 1.8, 1.5, and 1.0, from top
to bottom. The data for the random networks confirms the
data as first presented in [17]. Averaged over 10, 000 randomly
generated networks and 100 random initial configurations for
each value of K¯. T = 1000 system updates, initial damage
size d(0) = 1.
is constructed based on the model of Uniform Spatial
Graphs [23], in which vertices may connect uniformly at
random to other vertices within a spatial distance lc in
R
d. We do this as following: N nodes are randomly dis-
tributed in a d-dimensional space (only d = 2 will be
considered here), we then randomly pick a pair of nodes
u,v and create edge (u, v) if the spatial distance is within
the cut-off distance lc, disallowing repeated edges. This
procedure is repeated until the required average degree
K¯ is reached.
For a small cutoff distance, or any finite cutoff when
N → ∞, e.g., lc ∼ O(1), the characteristic path length
remains similar to that of d-dimensional regular lattices
[23]. For very large K¯, the system is in the chaotic regime
and any initial damage quickly percolates through the
network. Thus, the damage is only bounded by the sys-
tem size N , which gives us d¯L ∼ N1. In the limit of
K¯ → 0, nonzero damage can emerge only when the ini-
tial perturbation hits a short loop of oscillating nodes.
Let us assume we have a single connection from node A
to node B (A → B). In order to finish a simple loop
3
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FIG. 2: Scaling exponents γ(K¯) as a function of K¯ for ran-
dom networks (open squares), networks with local connec-
tions (open triangles), and small-world networks (open cir-
cles). This figure is obtained from the best fit of the data of
Fig. 1 using Eq. (6), (7), and (10). The data for the random
networks confirms the data as first presented in [17].
between A and B, we need to first select node B as the
starting point, which has a probability of about ∼ 1/N .
The probability to pick A as a neighboring node from B
to close the loop is∼ 1/nB, where nB is the possible num-
ber of B’s local neighbors. For a purely local network,
nB ≪ N . In a network of extreme local connections, the
probability of forming simple oscillating loops scales with
Ploop ∼ 1/nBN ∼ N−1. The number of such loops scales
with ∼ PloopK¯N ∼ const., and is thus independent of
the system size N . We expect to see coinciding Ham-
ming distances at low K¯ for different system sizes N on
extremely local networks. This remains valid until the
network reaches the percolation threshold where segre-
gated simple loops become connected and a giant cluster
emerges. Furthermore, compared to random networks,
the local connections lowered the probability of forming
the relevant component at criticality because each rel-
evant node needs to be controlled by another relevant
node. We thus expect that the damage increases slower
compared to random networks. In particular, the expo-
nent is smaller than 1/3 at Kc because γ = 1/3 at Kc for
random networks [17].
Fig. 1(a) shows the Hamming distance as a function
of the system size N for different connectivities K¯. As
one can see, for small K¯, the damage remains constant
as N increases. While for large K¯ (above the percolation
limit) the damage spreading increases with the system
size N according to a power-law. We therefore have:
d¯L(K¯,N) ∼ a(K¯)N
γL(K¯) , (7)
where γL → 0 at K¯ → 0, and γL → 1 for large K¯. If
we do a best fit for the data as shown in Fig. 1(a) using
Eq. (6), (7), we obtain γL as a function of K¯. This is
shown in Fig. 2.
Finally, Fig. 3(d) shows the average Hamming distance
for an initial damage size of one for local networks with
different system sizes N . As one can see, all curves coin-
cide below the percolation threshold. This confirms again
our assumption of the scaling behavior for low K¯.
C. RBNs with a Small-World Topology
Both purely random and purely local networks are ex-
treme network topologies. Many biological, technologi-
cal, and social networks lie somewhere between these two
extremes and are categorized as “small-world networks”
[24]. Small-world networks typically exhibit a number
of advantages over locally connected networks, such as
a short average path length, synchronizability, and im-
proved robustness against certain types of failures. It is
therefore of fundamental interest to study the damage
spreading in RBN networks with a small-world intercon-
nect topology.
Starting from the 2D Uniform Spatial Graph we have
used above for the locally interconnected network, we
apply a simply rewiring strategy to construct a small-
world network. Each existing connection in the Uniform
Spatial Graph is rewired with probability p to a randomly
chosen node. Thus, a fraction of p links in the network
are random long-range links, or small-world links, while
the remaining fraction of q = 1 − p links are local links
connecting geometrically local neighbors. We will use
q as the main parameter to represent the “strength” of
the local connections. Combined with the system size
N , Nq is approximately the number of nodes that have
a local connection (at the sparse percolation limit). For
Nq ≪ 1 the network is in the random network regime
(see Sec IIA); and for Nq ≫ 1 we obtain a spatially
local network (see Sec II B).
We will now use a similar scaling approach for small-
world RBNs as presented above for local and random
networks. Again, at very large K¯, the damage will only
be bounded by the system size, thus d¯SW ∼ N1. But for
K¯ → 0, the network is now composed of both local and
random (longer range) connections and the probability
of forming simple loops scales thus differently. Let us
assume we have a local link that has already been con-
nected (A→ B). The probability of having such a local
link is q, and to complete a simple loop that contains
this local connection, we first need to pick node B with
probability 1/N . Node B will then establish connections
again with his local neighbors with probability q, and fi-
nally choose node A to finish the loop with probability
1/nB. Thus, the final probability of having a simple loop
in this case scales with PloopL ∼ q2/N . Similarly the
probability of generating a simple loop involving random
long-range links is PloopR ∼ p2/N2. We compare these
two probabilities by dividing one by another:
PloopL
PloopR
=
q2
N
/
p2
N2
= (Nq) ·
q
p2
. (8)
In the spatially local network limit (Nq ≫ 1), PloopL is
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FIG. 3: Average Hamming distance (damage) d¯
after 200 system updates, averaged over 10, 000
randomly generated networks and 100 random
initial configurations for each value of K¯. The
initial damage size is one. Network topologies:
(a) random networks (p = 1.0, q = 0), (b)
small-world network with p = 0.9 (q = 0.1), (c)
small-world networks with p = 0.8 (q = 0.2),
and (d) networks with completely local connec-
tions (p = 0, q = 1.0). (a), (b), and (c) sug-
gest that all curves of random and small-world
networks for different N approximately intersect
in a characteristic point Ks. Ks moves toward
small K¯ as the fraction of local connections in-
creases (Ks ≃ 1.875 in (a), Ks ≃ 1.80 in (b)
and Ks ≃ 1.75 in (c)). For complete local net-
works all curves coincide below the percolation
threshold independently of N .
the leading term and the scaling follows Eq. (7). In the
random network limit (Nq ≪ 1), PloopR dominates and
the scaling follows Eq. (6). However, when the network
is in the small-world regime, PloopL and PloopR become
comparable. With some corrections, we therefore have:
PloopSW = PloopL + PloopR =
q2
N
+
p2
N2
≃
1
Nβ
, (9)
where β is somewhere between 1 and 2 and depends on
the value of Nq. The damage spreading scales therefore
with d¯SW ∼ N1−β . And for general K¯, we obtain:
d¯SW (K¯,N) ∼ a(K¯)N
γSW (K¯) , (10)
where γSW is somewhere between 1−β to 1. Fig. 2 shows
γR, γL, and γSW . As one can see, γSW goes from 1− β,
which is below zero, to 1 as K¯ increases. In addition, the
critical connectivity K¯, where γSW = 0, is different from
random networks and depends q. In random networks
this point is defined as the critical degree of stability Ks
[17]. Our results show that the introduction of local con-
nections in random networks changes Ks toward lower
K¯. As we have seen above, in extreme local networks Ks
is undefined because the Hamming distance for differ-
ent system sizes N simply coincide below the percolation
threshold. Fig. 3 (c) shows the deviation of Ks from the
observed value Ks = 1.875 for random networks.
D. Finite-size Scaling in Random Small-World
RBNs
While Eqs. (6) and (7) provide the scaling of the Ham-
ming distance for random and local networks, we are in-
terested in this section how q (i.e., the fraction of local
links) affects the damage spreading.
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FIG. 4: Hamming distance d¯ for different average degrees K¯
as a function of the density of local connections q. The inset
shows d¯ in the range of random networks (q → 0) to local
networks (q → 1). The different curves range from (top to
bottom) K¯ = 2.2 to K¯ = 1.02 with an interval of 0.2.
Fig. 4 shows the hamming distance as a function of q.
For sufficiently large Nq, i.e., close to the local network
limit, we assume (see Fig. 4) that the Hamming distance
approaches an asymptotic power law d¯SW ∼ qα(K¯). On
the other hand, the Hamming distance also depends on
the system size with d¯SW ∼ NγSW (K¯) (see Eq. (10)).
Thus, in the small-world regime (close to the local net-
work limit) the Hamming distance depends on both the
system size and the density of local (random) connec-
tions:
d¯SW (q, K¯,N) ∼ q
α(K¯)NγSW (K¯) . (11)
When q → 1, γSW (K¯)→ γL(K¯), so d¯SW → d¯L. While in
5
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FIG. 5: Reconstructed γSW from Eq. 15 by measuring α(K¯)
from best fits of Fig. 4 at q = 0.2 (p = 0.8). Squares (black)
and circles (red) are measured γR and γSW , respectively, from
Fig. 1, while triangles (blue) are reconstructed γSW from γR
and α(K¯).
the random network limit (Nq ≪ 1), d¯ only depends on
N , d¯R ∼ NγR(K¯) with γR(K¯) as illustrated in Fig. 2. To
connect the above two cases and to capture the finite-size
behavior in the small-world regime, one can construct the
full scaling behavior of d¯SW (q, K¯,N):
d¯SW (q, K¯,N) ∼ q
α(K¯)NγSW (K¯)f(Nq) , (12)
where f(x) is a scaling function such that
f(x) ∼
{
x−α if x≪1
const. if x≫1
. (13)
The random network limit is obtained provided that
d¯ ∼ qα(K¯)NγSW (K¯)(Nq)−α ∼ NγSW−α ∼ NγR , (14)
i.e.,
γR = γSW − α(K¯) . (15)
Given γR we can express γSW by measuring α(K¯) at dif-
ferent K¯. Fig. 5 shows the reconstructed γSW with the
measured data, which satisfy the above proposed asymp-
totic scaling relation.
To analyze our data, Eq. (12) can also be written as
d¯SW (q, K¯,N) ∼
(Nq)γSW
qγSW−α
f(Nq) ∼
1
qγR
g(Nq) , (16)
where g(x) = xγSW f(x). Thus plotting d¯qγR vs. Nq
should yield coinciding data with g(x). The limits of
random and spatially local networks correspond to the
asymptotic small and large argument of g(x), which gives
us the exponents γR, and γL,
g(x) ∼
{
xγR if x≪1
xγSW → xγL if x≫1
. (17)
Fig. 6 shows the scaling plots of the Hamming distance
as a function of the product of the system size N and
strength of the local connections q, as predicted by the
proposed finite-size scaling for small-world RBNs. Also,
given that γR and γL are functions of the average degree
K¯, as shown in Fig. 2, the shapes of f(x) or g(x) also
changes with K¯. As one can see in Fig. 6(a)-(c), g(x)
coincides under different K¯. In addition, the asymptotic
behavior of g(x) at x≪ 1 and x≫ 1 agree very well with
our measured “phenomenological” exponents γR(K¯), and
γL(K¯) at K¯ = 1.4, K¯ = 2.0, and K¯ = 4.0, respectively.
III. WIRING COST
From an engineering perspective, one wants to typi-
cally minimize the wiring cost of a network, maximize
the communication characteristics, and maximize the ro-
bustness against failures. The electric power grid is a
good example and so are nano-scale interconnect net-
works [22]. In this section we will look at these three
trade-offs for RBNs.
The average shortest path length is generally a good
measure for the communication characteristics of a com-
plex network. In a directed network we define l as the
mean geodesic (i.e., shortest) distance between vertex
pairs in a network [12]:
l =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i6=j
dij , (18)
where dij is the geodesic distance from vertex i to vertex
j. Here we have excluded the distance from each node to
itself. Eq. 18 will be problematic if the network has more
than one component, which is very likely for small K¯. To
avoid the problem of disconnected networks, we compute
the average path length only for those vertex pairs that
actually have a connecting path between them.
For real-world networks, if shortcuts, i.e., the ran-
dom small-world links, have to be realized physically, the
cost of a long-range connection is likely to grow with its
length. E.g., the power consumption for wireless broad-
cast communication in free space generally could be a
cubic power of geometric distance, while the implemen-
tation of directional antenna will reduce the transmission
cost significantly [5]. Petermann et al. [15] discuss the
wiring-cost for some spatial small-world networks rang-
ing from integrated circuits, the Internet to cortical net-
works. For simplicity, we assume here that the wiring
cost has a linear dependency on the geometrical distance
between two nodes.
Fig. 7 shows the product of the wiring cost cost, the
average shortest path length l, and the damage size d¯ as
a function of the average connectivity K¯ and the density
of random connections p. In addition, Fig. 8 shows the
contour projection of Fig. 7 using the same data. For
example, it shows that given a specific target average
connectivity K¯, networks with a high density of random
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FIG. 6: Scaling plots of the Hamming distance in small-world networks as predicted by the finite-size scaling argument
(Eq. (16)). (a) K¯ = 1.4; (b) K¯ = 2.0; and (c) K¯ = 3.0. The straight line segments correspond to asymptotic power-
law behavior of the scaling function g(x) with exponents γR and γL, measured from Fig. 2 at given K¯, for small and large
arguments, respectively, as described in the text (Eq. (17)).
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FIG. 7: The product of damage size d, the network wiring
cost cost, and the average shortest path length l as a func-
tion of the average connectivity K¯ and the density of random
connections p. The color density corresponds to the value of
d× l × cost
connections (i.e., close to random networks, p → 1) will
have a similar overall performance, cost, and robustness
as networks that have more local connections (p → 0),
however, whereas p→ 1 networks have a high wiring cost,
a low average path length, and a low damage resistivity,
p → 0 networks have a low wiring cost, a high average
path length, and a high damage resistivity. Fig. 8 also
tells us what will be the lowest K¯ and corresponding p
allowed at a given robustness level. This is indicated by
the circles.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have systematically investigated the damage
spreading in spatial and small-world random Boolean
networks. We have found that (1) spatially local con-
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d  l    cost
FIG. 8: Contour projection of Fig. 7. The color density cor-
responds to the value of d × l × cost. At p = 0 the network
topology is completely local; p = 1 corresponds to the random
network; and for 0 < p < 1 the network is in the small-world
regime. The circles indicate the position of lowest possible K¯
and corresponding p for given tolerance level of d× l × cost.
nections change the scaling of the relevant component at
very low connectivities (K¯ ≪ 1) and (2) that the critical
connectivity of stability Ks changes compared to ran-
dom networks [17]. At higher K¯, this scaling remains
unchanged. We also show that the relevant component
of spatially local networks scales with a power-law as the
system size N increases, but with a different exponent
for local and small-world networks. The scaling behav-
iors are obtained by finite-size scaling. In addition, we
have investigated the trade-offs between the wiring cost
of the networks, the communication characteristics, and
the robustness, i.e., the damage spreading. From an engi-
neering perspective, one typically wants to minimize the
wiring cost, maximize the communication characteristics,
e.g., the shortest path between any two nodes, and max-
imize the robustness against failures. Our new findings
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provide these key trade-offs and allow to determine the
lowest connectivity K¯ and the amount of randomness p
in a network for a given robustness, average path length,
and wiring cost.
Future work will focus on the investigation of real-
world networks and the application of our methodology
to make them more robust, cheaper, and more efficient.
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